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I would like to present the logistic matters and experiences in the Darfur mission.
Everything that is written in this article is based on personal experience, observation
and opinion. I had spent six months in the field as an EU military advisor to help and
build a working logistic system to African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).
Antecedents
In prehistoric times, the peoples of what is now Darfur were related to those of the Nile
Valley (including Egypt), whose caravans probably reached the region by 2500 B.C.E.
According to tradition, the region’s first rulers were the Daju. By around 900 C.E.,
Christianity had spread to the area; by the thirteenth century, however, the region had
fallen under the domination of the powerful Islamic empire of Kanem-Bornu to the
west, and the Tunjur replaced the Daju as the ruling elite of the region. The sultanate of
Darfur first entered the historical record during the seventeenth century, under
Sulayman. Sulayman belonged to the Keira Dynasty, which claimed Arab descent and
which removed the Tunjur from power. Except for an interval during the nineteenth
century, this dynasty ruled Darfur until 1916. Gradually the Keira merged with the Fur,
the agricultural people over whom they ruled. (The state’s name, Dar Fur, means “house
of the Fur” in Arabic.)
The slave trade figured prominently in both the formation and the expansion of the
Darfur Sultanate. Parties from Darfur obtained slaves and ivory by either raiding or
trading with the stateless societies that lay to its south and southwest. Not only did
Darfur’s rulers export slaves to North Africa and along the “forty days’ road,” which
crossed the desert from Darfur to Egypt, but slaves also served the sultan as soldiers,
laborers, and bureaucrats. Sulayman’s successors expanded the state. In 1786 Sultan
Muhammad Tayrab conquered the province of Kordofan from the Funj Sultanate of
Sennar to the east. In 1821, however, Egyptian forces conquered the Funj Sultanate and
wrested Kordofan from Darfur. Traders from Khartoum then began to compete in the
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slave trade with those in Darfur. Turkish-Egyptian forces under Rahma al-Zubayr
conquered Darfur in 1874 and overthrew the Keira sultan. In 1885 a Sudanese rebellion
under a religious leader called the Mahdi overthrew the Egyptian state, which had come
under increasing British influence. In 1898 British forces defeated the Mahdist state and
placed it under Anglo-Egyptian administration. Under their policy of indirect rule, the
British restored the Darfur Sultanate under Ali Dinar Zakariyya. Ali Dinar played a
significant role in an Islamic, anti-Western alliance that formed during World War I.
The Anglo-Egyptian government subsequently invaded Darfur, killed Ali Dinar, ended
the sultanate, and incorporated Darfur into Sudan. After Sudan attained independence in
1956, Darfur remained under Sudanese rule. Darfur was ruled by commissioners who
neglected the basic needs of the people and merely fulfilled the interests of the central
government. Only after the inhabitants of El-Fasher revolted against Khartoum in the
early 1980s, were they allowed to have several regional governors from Darfur in brief
succession. However, since the Islamists usurped power in Sudan in 1989, the majority
of the governors appointed in Darfur have been of Arab origin. According to the motto
“divide and rule” and constantly trying to weaken the spirit of unity among the
Darfurians, the Khartoum government divided Darfur, which was originally one state,
into three smaller states with three capitals:
• El-Fasher for Northern Darfur
• Nyala for Southern Darfur
• El-Geneina for Western Darfur.
The conflict
Open warfare erupted in February 2003 when the two loosely allied rebel groups, the
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM), attacked military installations.
This was followed closely by peace agreements brokered by the United States to end
the twenty-year-old civil war in the south of Sudan which allocated government
positions and oil revenue to the rebels in the south. At that time rebels in Darfur,
seeking an end to the region’s chronic economic and political marginalization, also took
up arms to protect their communities against a twenty-year campaign by government-
backed militias recruited among groups of Arab extraction in Darfur and Chad. These
“Janjaweed” militias have over the past year received government support to clear
civilians from areas considered disloyal to the Sudanese government. Militia attacks and
a scorched-earth government offensive has led to massive displacement, indiscriminate
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killings, looting and mass rape, all in infringement of the 1949 Geneva Convention that
prohibits attacks on civilians.
The war, which risks inflicting irreparable damage on a delicate ethnic balance of
seven million people who are uniformly Muslim, is actually multiple intertwined
conflicts. One is between government-aligned forces and rebels; a second entails
indiscriminate attacks of the government-sponsored Janjaweed militia on civilians; and
a third involves a struggle among Darfur communities themselves. Its implications go
far beyond Darfur’s borders. The war indirectly threatens the regimes in both Sudan and
Chad and has the potential to inspire insurgencies in other parts of the country. But this
conflict in stabilizes not only these countries but the others around as well.
The mission
For this reason, after the Peace negotiations when the Parties (African countries, various
fighting fractions-SLA, JEM, NRMD,-UN, EU, NATO and USA) agreed to send
peacekeepers to Darfur to stop the violence, they had to act immediately. African Union
(AU) decided to send troops as soon as possible to the area to secure it. Because the AU
as a new organization faced with serious financial shortages and with some capacities
(Logistic, Air Ops, IT) the EU, USA and NATO offered him help on these fields.
After the Donor conference all organization decided to send observers to help and
participate in the AU second peacekeeping mission (African Union Mission In Sudan-
AMIS) in Africa. The donors begun to send their aid (money and equipments as well) to
the mission area but the African troops weren’t prepare to handle them. Both of the
shortage of military and police forces and the missing positions mostly in the logistic
field made the situation very difficult on the ground. The African countries sent mostly
infantry troops without working logistic support system (combat support units, etc).
However the soldiers made good work as infantry units, nobody takes care about
keeping the records or put in file the donated equipments for this reason a lot of things
were missing or were used in a wrong way.
There were shortages of staff officers in the Logistic and planning sections, which
caused real problems and various problems with the provision (food, drinking and
potable water, bed items, sanitation, communication, etc).
The donors offered sometimes all services or facilities to AU, for example USA
provided the all camps construction through the state own company, PAE. Although the
PAE made a really good job, which based on the contract between AU and USA, from
the AU/AMIS part nobody could directed and check them properly, because the missing
logistic experience.
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In the same time the AU officials realized that they overcharged their troops on the
ground and they didn’t have enough capacity to secure the Darfur area and run the
mission as well. So for this reason they deceived to enlarge the troop numbers and expand
the all mission. In the first phase the real strength of the troops were 138 MILOB’s
(Military Observer) and 195 Rwandese and 193 Nigerian Protection Forces (Aug 04).
On the second phase the strength of troops supposed to be 3320 person but the AU
and the participants couldn’t manage to fill the all position.(2774 troops, included
Civpol’s were on the field at the end of June 05.) This happened in the enhancement
phase as well (AMIS-IIE), where the mission expected to expand to 6171 military
personal and 1560 civilian police( at the end of October 05.) but they couldn’t fill the all
positions and the third phase, where 12300 personal were planned, this phase never
come on board…
The donors agreed on it and offered not only money, Air lift for the African troops
and equipments but logistic advisors/expertise as well, which offers were requested and
accepted by AU officials. This phase was AMIS II-E and begun on 1 July 05. For this
time the EU logistic expertise begun to deploy to Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El-
Fasher as well.
With and wide scale agreement between AU and the donors there were constructed
various new position inside the AU and the mission to encourage the growth of the
logistic capacity in AMIS. The highest organization inside AU who coordinated the
mission in Darfur, the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) was, where was located the
ACMC section where the EU, NATO and USA advisors worked. Generally the ACMC
is the J4 and J8 function within the DITF, working directly to the Chief of Staff.
The ACMC is responsible for coordinating all logistic support between the AU, the
Donor and Partner nations and Contractors in order to provide support to the operational
commanders. It provides logistic synchronization support to the movement plan, the
force generation plan, the infrastructure development plan and the equipment delivery
programmer working in co-ordination with the Logistic Cell at Mission HQ in
Khartoum and the JLOC in El Fasher.
The ACMC co-ordinates and priorities the overall containment effort for AMIS
tasking the JLOC through the chain of command as required.
Because Darfur is only a part of Sudan it was important to establish an Headquarter
in Khartoum to deal with the Sudanese authorities and represent the AU in all matters
which are related with AMIS. In Khartoum we had a logistic cell as well.
Generally this section acted as the logistic transit hub in co-ordination with ACMC
and the JLOC. Provided diplomatic clearances (Visas and Customs clearance), as
required, and provided movement and contractual support to AMIS.
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In El-Fasher (the capital of Darfur) deployed the Joint Logistic Operation Centre
(JLOC), which is organized and directed the logistic system in the mission area and
made the real work on the field.
Generally the JLOC acted as the logistic focus within the FHQ for both the Military
and Police missions. It prepared operational logistic plans in support of the operation
and acted as the operational level logistic authority. The JLOC ensured that the
operational theatre is properly sustained. The JLOC worked in direct co-ordination with
the Logistic Cell at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the ACMC in Addis Ababa. You can
see the organization chart in Figure 1.
Figure 1. AU/JLOC structure at El Fasher (Source: AMIS 2005)
Chief JLOC. The Chief JLOC was responsible for the delivery of logistic support to
AMIS within the operational theatre. He worked through the Deputy Head of Mission
and operates on behalf of both the Force Commander and the CIVPOL Commissioner.
Deputy Chief JLOC. He acted on behalf of the Chief JLOC and is the JLOC Chief of
Staff, coordinating all operational logistic staff effort.
Field Support Section (FSS). The FSS provided the direct logistic contact with
Sectors on behalf of Chief JLOC and worked in co-ordination with the functional cells.
The FSS was responsible for the delivery of up to date logistic reports and returns from
Sectors to the Chief JLOC.
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He was responsible in the mission area (with close relation with PAE and its
subcontractors) for the food-catering service, camp management, water supply,
environmental, health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for other orders from
Chief JLOC.
Log Ops and Plans. He provided logistic planning support to the Force Commander
and the CIVPOL Commissioner. Provided real time logistic support to the operation
ensuring that the military and CIVPOL are properly sustained with C Sups in co-
ordination with PAE.
Maintenance. He ensured that all vehicles in theatre are properly maintained and
supported in co-ordination with Contractors.
Materiel Management. He ensured that all equipment is properly distributed and
managed to support the needs of the operation and all equipment is properly accounted for.
Movement/Air Ops. He coordinated all in-theatre J4 movement including tactical
airlift, SH, (when in a J4 function) and road convoys.
Medical/Environmental Health. He coordinated medical and health service support
to include treatment and evacuation of casualties, medical logistics, preventative
medicine and environmental health with PAE and other medical providers. This
position wasn’t filled nor by EU or AU in this time, for this everybody from JLOC
deled with this matters.
Communications/IT. He coordinated the distribution and maintenance of all
communications and IT equipment in accordance with the communications plan.
CIVPOL. He acted as the CIVPOL interface to the JLOC ensuring that all CIVPOL
requirements and enhancement needs are met. This position wasn’t manned by EU
under my service time.
EU advisors-JLOC
The first EU advisors arrived in the theatre on 29 June from United Kingdom, Spain and
Hungary. We spent our first weeks in Addis Ababa because we didn’t get our visas in
time, so we occupied ourselves in Addis to help inside the DITF. Thereafter we
received our visas and went to Khartoum first after that to Darfur. When we arrived
there we got temporarily accommodation only for a time because the camp was
overcrowded. Nearly all European expertise worked and lived in Africa previously
(Myself in Western Sahara-MINURSO) but we didn’t prepared ourselves so many
difficulties what we find there.
We needed some days to accommodate ourselves and try to begin our job.
Unfortunately we didn’t have offices, the JLOC were existing only on paper and not in
the real life, and we didn’t find our African counter partners, who we have to work
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together. For this reason the Force Commander decided that we have to work in the
FHQ logistic section and take part the replacement and development of AMIS II-E.
Despite that we weren’t under the Force Commander command we begun to work with
the FHQ Logistic cell and met with more problems. However the PAE and their
subcontractor worked hard to construct new camps and enlarge the previous facilities
they were late because the rainy season (In this time the only way to transport materials
was with helicopters).
We had to support the troops on the ground and organize the Airlift in close
cooperation with AU, EU, NATO and USA and provide accommodations, food, water
and others for the newcomers. Table 1 shows the AMIS II-E deployment schedule.
Of course this schedule changed because of the circumstances (weather, readiness of
camps, etc) and only in October we could finish the enlargement of AMIS.
Table 1. The AMIS II-E deployment schedule
Battalions Deployment
Dates
Number
of Pax
Estimated
Freight
(Tons)
Est
Ammo
(Tons)
Preferred
APOE
Preferred
APOD
Airlift
Donor
Nation
Nigerian Bn 1
Sector 2
1–14 Jul 680 40 18 Kaduna Nyala GER
UE
Rwandan Bn 1
Sector 1
15–29 Jul 680 32 16 Kigali Nyala US
NATO
Rwandan Bn 2
Sector 7
30 Jul–9 Aug 538 32 16 Kigali El Fasher US
NATO
Gambian Coy
Force HHQ
30 Jul–9 Aug 196 12 7 Banjul* El Fasher ?
Nigerian Bn 2
Sector 8
10–18 Aug 876
(note 3)
40 18 Abuja* Nyala UK
NATO
Senegalese Bn
Sector 5
20–29 Aug 538 32 16 Dakar El Fasher France
UE
Nigerian Bn 3
Sector 3
1–9 Sep 484
(note 3)
40 18 Abuja* El Fasher UK
NATO
Rwandan Bn 3
Sector 4
30 Sept–6 Oct 538 40 18 Kigali El Fasher ?
South African Bn
Sector 6
22–25 Oct 550
(Note 4)
32 16 Bloemfontein
or
Pretoria
El Fasher Netherlands
NATO
South African
Eng Coy, EOD
team Reserve Coy
28–29 Sep 210 12 (Note 2) Bloemfontein
or
Pretoria
El Fasher Netherlands
NATO
Kenyan MP
Sector 1
30 Sep 25 2 – Nairobi El Fasher ?
Source: AMIS 2005
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Under this time the all JLOC positions (except the CivPol and the Medical
Environmental Health) were filled by the donor countries (Spain, France, United
Kingdom, Sweden, Dania, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, USA and CA) but the AU only filled
the logistic positions in JLOC at the end of October, till this time we worked alone with
all responsibility. When we received our partners it was clear that expect some they
don’t have any logistic background (graduation in logistic school or experience on the
field), this made our job more difficult.
The other problem was that no any African unit (except the South Africans) arrived
with full capacity units, because in the battalions only on paper worked Combat Support
Units (Sector Support Cell). These units filled with infantry soldiers and not with
logistics. The lack of logistic skill, everybody expected everything from the civilian
contractor (PAE). However there is a new trend in peacekeeping or other operations that
civilian companies make a lot of job, for what the army don’t want waste soldiers or
they don’t have the necessary qualification for it (Logistic, Air Ops, IT,
Communication, cleaning and construction jobs), the military component has to plan the
mission needs, order the service and properly check the contractors before the payment.
For this reason very important that the J4 (logistic) section will be manned with
qualified and capable officers, who can deal with the civilian companies in all matters
and level. In Darfur this isn’t worked properly and the mission leaders didn’t know
really what was in the contracts, for this reason they expected sometimes more service
from the contractor, what AU and USA government agreed on previously. One of our
first jobs was to read trough the contracts to finalize what the civilian companies have
to do and what is our (AMIS) right and obligation and create a working system together
with sectors and the civilian companies (reports, registrations, etc). After that all of us
begun to work on his job, because I was responsible for the Field Support Service, this
mean for the food-catering service, camp management, water supply, environmental,
health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for other orders from Chief JLOC. The
mission area was the same size as France and in the 8 sectors 33 camps were located.
What made our job more difficult that in this time (from June till the end of 2005)
the security situation was relatively calm but unpredictable, the banditry attacks,
stealing of livestock, harassment of the civil populace by armed militias were usual
nearly on every weeks.
The fighting’s renewed in the general areas (Jebel Marra, Amu valley, Muhjeria,
etc.) between Sudanese Armed Forces, Janjaweed militias and SLA and JEM. The
armed arab militias attacked villages (Tawila, Mukjar, etc) and IDP’s camps as well.
The rebels attacked GOS and Humanitarian convoys as well and there were some
clashes between SLA and JEM. Violent threats against AMIS, UN and NGO (Non
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Governmental Organizations) have increased so the situation begun to be more
problematic. I think sometimes the fighting fractions agreed that AMIS could be a
target. It happened that between Khor Abechi and Menawashi an unknown fighting
fraction attacked to PAE trucks, where they killed the civilian drivers and not so later
other 5 Nigerian soldiers, who arrive to relive the convoy. In another case other group
attacked a patrol in Sector 5, where they took over all the equipments from the soldiers
and released them without combat boots, so they had to walk back to the camp on bare
foot. A lot of times they shouted for AMIS helicopters (on 24 December 05 one fall
down and everybody on the board died) convoys and camps. But the Sudanese Army
wasn’t much better because they painted their attack helicopters and military vehicles
for white and attacked the SLA and JEM positions with them. Of course after a time the
fighters didn’t take any difference between GOS or AMIS white cars. Time to time the
Sudanese Army organized us quite nice military parade around the FHQ, which were
frustrated our soldiers. When we received the first Canadian APC’s (Armoured Personal
Vehicle) the Sudanese authorities send us an official warning letter that they won’t
tolerate if any of them going in the hand of SLA or JEM. After this letter they organized
a tour with soldiers, tanks and various military equipment (from the 1960’s till today,
mostly Russian equipments). The soldiers were yelling, crying and shouting with
weapons around the camp, I think they try to show us who has the real power in Sudan.
Under my time I could observe two of this kind of parade in El-Fasher.
The Humanitarian situation in the IDP’s camps were becoming over congested, the
facilities at the camps were overstretched. However the Humanitarian Agencies had
continued to provide life-saving Humanitarian assistance to IDP’s as well residents in
the villages but some of them evacuated their aid workers because the banditries and
attacks against the Humanitarian convoys and workers.
Although the situation was unpredictable the presence of Humanitarian agencies,
AMIS Milob’s, CivPol’s and foreign observers helped in stemming the tide of hostilities.
In this situation AMIS/CFC (Cease Fire Committee) had continued to intensify its
activities to reduce the incidence of ceasefire violations in Darfur. In accordance with
its mandate as contained in article 4 of HCFA (8 April 2004 AMIS) continuously
investigated allegations in response to reports of ceasefire violations (Baraka, Graida,
Kalma, etc). The regular patrols were conducted by Milob’s to promote confidence
building and also to show AU presence on the ground. Unfortunately after some
shouting incident against AU personals or in difficult situations the leaders of AMIS
gave orders to delay patrols to save our soldiers. These situations were only temporarily
time and after that we begun to conduct the patrols again. The mission leaders and the
CFC embarked on consultations with all parties in the conflict and the Humanitarian
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Agencies and attended the Joint commission meeting once a month at N’djamena,
Chad. This was the real situation in AMIS-IIE phase and at the end of October we had 3
infantry battalion from Nigeria, 3 infantry battalion from Rwanda, 1 infantry battalion
from Senegal, 1 infantry company from Gambia (as a reserve unit in FHQ), 1 Military
Police Unit from Kenya and 1 infantry company, 1 engineer platoon and a EOD section
from South Africa.
In the same time we had Military Observers, Civilian Police members, the workers
of contractors (PAE-USA and Skylink-Canada) and their subcontractors (Amzar-Food,
catering service, MSS-medical and Hygienic service, etc.) and other local workers
(building and cleaning camps, etc) who didn’t live all in the camps but they used our
facilities as well. This caused new challenges to our overloaded camps systems.
The strength of AMIS was grown up quickly and when I left it was the next:
military all ranks: 5611
CivPol: 1195
PAE: 229
AMZAR: 418
Skylink: 139
Total: 7589
As the Deputy Field Support Service I had to work in close relationship with my
African counter partner and the contractors on the next topics.
Food-catering service. Monitoring PAE and AMZAR in the field, are adhering to
the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU. In close cooperation with AMZAR & PAE
organise the food delivery to the remote camps with AirOps. I was working with the
PAE Food & Facilities Manager any problems regarding with the AU. I gave advice
AMZAR in catering field, training for cooks (kitchen guideline, etc.). Our section had
to cooperate with other sections (Ops and Plans, Logistics, Mess committee, etc.) and
we had take care of delegations, guests.
Camp management. Monitoring PAE in the field, are adhering to the contract and
SOPs, as set out by the AU.
I had total responsibility for the smooth running of the camp catering, liaising with
the Catering Contractor on a daily basis. All Facilities including but not limited to
Laundry, Dining Rooms, Accommodation, Camp Maintenance & Equipment Security.
Water supply. I had monitored PAE in the field, are adhering to the contract and
SOPs, as set out by the AU.
I worked in close cooperation with PAE water manager to provide drinkable and
potable water to all mission area. We checked the quality of water time to time (with
normal senses and labor as well).
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Environmental, Health and Camp sanitation. I had monitored PAE and MSS in the
field, are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU. We worked in close
cooperation with PAE camp sanitation manager and MSS operational manager. Our job
was the Health & Hygiene Management within the Camp Facilities, to include waste
management (Fuel spillage, waste disposal, sewage) and the Stress management
(entertainment).
Fire Marshall. I had monitored PAE camp managers in the field, are adhering to the
contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU. We planned and checked the Fire evacuation
plans, and worked in close cooperation with PAE. We organized Fire extinguishes
delivery and refresh to the remote camps with AirOps. We coordinated with the PAE
Operational Manager any problems regarding the AU (cooking inside the tents, etc.).
The difficulties and challenges
Although most of EU advisor had served in Africa previously, because the shortage of
time we got only one day training to prepare ourselves for this mission in Brussels. I
think later in other operation need to organize a course at least 2–3 days to know each
other better and make more detailed preparations.
AU wasn’t prepared to handle the EU-NATO-USA advisors in a right way (“white
face problem”). We faced with a lot of uncomfortable situation when African officers
told us that we are colonialist or the spy of western countries. It happened that an
African politician questioned the contents of our reports from Darfur. He told that our
report didn’t reflect the real and true situation on the field and he sent us emails, in
which he stated our limited capacity to help AU mission in Sudan. As a Hungarian it
caused me very bad time because we never-ever had any colony in Africa and we don’t
have any economic or other interest in this place. We arrived to help and left behind us
our families, job and everything and risked our life and personal safety. No any of us
from the JLOC received salary or any goods from AU, we were paid by EU and our
own countries. Fortunately this wasn’t too usual situation because most of our
colleagues were helpful and from the AU officials we got all support what we needed.
However, we learned that the Africans are very sensitive and to give them advice and
help sometimes difficult.
We had quite basic environment, no EU standard (camp sanitation, personal
hygiene, accommodation, food, etc.) As I mentioned previously when we arrived to
Darfur, it was the enhancement time and most of the camps were overcrowded, that
caused problems.
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We met with different cultural conventions, different nationals. Religious practice
and possible oversensitive (to work in Muslim environment as a Christian) caused us
problems as well.
The different approach about responsibilities and rights in the Mission (rank,
position, qualification, etc.) gave us headache all the time.
Problems which we are faced
– To live/work in a unknown environment. Not only for us but some African
officers and soldiers were unknown this place and we had to learn to respect and
understand the locals and cooperate with them.
– No JOC only JLOC was worked in the mission. When the JLOC was created we
saw that there is some misunderstanding between the military and civilian components
and this caused unnecessary difficulties in the everyday life. The JLOC begun to
harmonize between the components to clarify their logistic needs and give them advice
and help to fulfill their tasks. We faced another problems as well, which we couldn’t
solved alone so for this reason we suggested to create JOC (Joint Operation Centre) to
harmonize the work of all part of AMIS (CFC, military, police and civilian parts). I
don’t know why but some high ranking officers rejected this idea and in 2005 this
section/group was only in our dreams.
– No real responsibility (missing positions as well camp commandants, logistic,
hygiene and fire officers). As I mentioned before we needed to take more responsibility
in the work with civilian companies/contractors. For example, I suggested that we have
to appoint in each camp logistic officers, camp commandants (a kind of quartermaster,
who is dealing with the camp order and organize everything that is related with the
camp), hygiene and fire officers, who had to work in close relationship with PAE camp
managers (their responsibilities were to run the camps) and with the MSS doctors. No
any soldiers like if a civilian try to give them orders (how they have to clean their tents,
behave in the camps etc.) for this reason it was important that the Army part of this
mission, not to be only a customer who order services from the civilians but a
participant who take his own responsibility to run the mission. When I left only in El-
Fasher we had an appointed camp commander and his work proved that when the
military and police forces took more responsibility and worked with the contractors,
everything went more smoothly than before.
– Slow decision making. Because of lack of information, problems with
communications and other short falls made difficult to decide on time and act rapidly as
necessary in amilitary operation.
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– No any daily logistic sitreps from sectors to FHQ. Some camps didn’t have radios,
laptops or computers and if they send any reports they wrote them with hands. Most of
camps didn’t send any daily logistic reports as we did in UN or NATO missions for this
reason we didn’t get correct information from their needs. The sector logistic officers
(who were mostly infantry, artillery or other specialties) without this information could
report only their request to us. For this reason they got more logistical help than the
camps. When we arrived in any camps the problems came out immediately (we don’t
have cars, spare tires, communication equipment, cameras, computers, no enough food,
etc) and we were surprised because nobody reported their real situation. If we want to
run smoothly a military or peacekeeping operation very important to receive real
information from the field and act immediately to fulfill the logistic needs.
– No proper planning. It means logistically not as an operational way. For example
it caused a lot of problem when AU officials planned their fuel needs (helicopters, cars,
etc) because they planned for 12 days but the amount fuel that they calculated was
enough only for 8 days. So AU could save approximately 1million USD but Canada
(who donated the helicopters and the flight hours) had cost this more. For this reason in
the rainy season we couldn’t send enough food to the camps to feed our soldiers. One
soldiers supposed to get 15 kg food/week (including the wrapping materials) so we
needed for the all mission weekly 120 tons of food. When I arrived we received
35–45% of the necessary amount of ingredients and when I left 76%, but we never
received the full amount. This happened because we didn’t get enough fuel and other
reasons as well. A lot of times the PAE used its own helicopters to supply African
troops on the ground because the AMIS helicopters couldn’t flight the lack of kerosene.
As I know we never paid the extra work and the used fuel, flight hours to PAE. This
only one of the problems what we are faced because the improper planning.
– Lack of Human resources or using them in a wrong way, in a wrong position. For
example when the positions in JLOC were filled by AU, we didn’t have enough African
officers who graduate in Logistic school or have logistic experience. We requested an
officer from FHQ who has 15 years experience in transportation field and we couldn’t get
her, because she was the only who could make PowerPoint presentation in her section.
For this reason they didn’t released her and we got another officer who didn’t know too
much about transportation matters and he had to learn it. Fortunately all officers who got
position in JLOC wanted to perform good job and this made our job easier.
– Lack of communication between sections or components and rivalrization. First
we didn’t have enough communication equipments and the donors gave not the same
type systems. This is a technical thing, which we can solve with professional
communication and IT personals and harmonize the systems to work. But we never had
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enough specialists for this job. Another problem was that there were clashes between
the military and police components and the JLOC as well (rights, responsibilities,
etc.).It takes extra time and efforts to solve these situations.
– African officials and high ranking officers (not all!) behavior towards non African
advisors that I mentioned previously.
Possible future for EU in Africa.
– Bringing some of our experience as advisors.
– Take part in the training and build a working training system (Communications,
IT, Logistic and AirOps) We can expect growing ethnical and religious problems in
Africa and more hot place but not a good idea to send any European troops there, only
military and police advisors and trainers (historical reasons, sensitiveness).
– Establish a planning process in the EU to be able providing support to other
organizations (AU) in crisis management operations and provide short and long term
support. It can be a long term support to have staff or liaison officers at AU HQ in
Addis Ababa to support the AU with long term crises management (mostly in logistic
and contract issues).
– Take part in the rebuilding process and help to develop the local economy.
I think the EU advisors made useful job in AMIS and if we use the experience what
we got in Sudan we can prepare ourselves to make a better job in the next missions in
Africa (Somalia, Bissau-Guinea, etc) and develop a real partnership with the African
countries to solve the problems of the continent.
